An alleged victim appealed the entry of a domestic violence order against him and also appealed the order dismissing his petition for a domestic violence order. The circuit court did not err in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner did not allege facts sufficient to justify a DVO under KRS 403.740. Affirmed.

Because of the extreme brevity of the domestic violence hearing to reissue a DVO, and lack of substantial evidence, the family court’s findings were clearly erroneous when reissuing a DVO. Vacated and remanded.

The petitioner’s allegations for a domestic violence order were sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition for protection under the domestic abuse statute for herself and her unborn child. This portion of the DVO, affirmed. However, the family court lacked jurisdiction to award the petitioner temporary custody of her unborn child. This portion of the DVO, reversed and remanded.

On appeal from the entry of a DVO, the appellant argued that his alleged bad acts did not rise to the level of domestic violence as defined by Kentucky Revised Statutes KRS 403.720(1); that there was no evidence that domestic violence and abuse may occur again; and that the circuit court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. He also argued that the circuit court violated his constitutional rights by failing to explain to him the seriousness of a DVO, and by not giving him the opportunity to seek counsel. Affirmed.

Issues include whether a defendant who is convicted of an attempted sex crime is required to complete post-incarceration supervision where the provisions of the supervision statute make no mention of attempt crimes, but the provisions of another sex offender statute—SORA—expressly include attempt crimes. Affirmed in part. Reversed in part. Remanded.

For roughly six weeks, students at the University of Louisville reported a series of robberies, burglaries, and a sexual assault for which the appellant was ultimately charged and convicted. Prior to trial, the appellant moved the court to sever the first-degree rape, first-degree robbery, and firstdegree burglary charges, which all involved the same victim, from the remainder of the charges. When weighed against the remaining charges, the trial court correctly found the single incident of rape and assault insufficient to require severance under RCr 8.31. Affirmed.